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Abstract
Based on the conceptualizations of organized crime as both an enterprise and a form of
governance, borderland as a spatial category, and borders as institutions, this paper
looks at the politics of bordering practices by organized crime in the Colombian-
Venezuelan borderlands. It posits that contrary to the common assumptions about
transnational organized crime, criminal organizations not only blur or erode the border
but rather enforce it to their own benefit. In doing so, these groups set norms to regulate
socio-spatial practices, informal and illegal economies, and migration flows, creating
overlapping social orders and, lastly, (re)shaping the borderland. Theoretically, the
analysis brings together insights from political geography, border studies, and orga-
nized crime literature, while empirically, it draws on direct observation, criminal justice
data, and in-depth interviews.
Keywords Organized crime . Borderlands . Political geography . Space . Colombia .
Venezuela
Introduction
The Colombian-Venezuelan border is currently considered one of the most dangerous
borderlands worldwide as turf wars, among a plethora of non–state armed actors, have
spiked violence. Meanwhile, the exodus of Venezuelan nationals fleeing the political
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-020-09399-3




1 German Institute for Global and Area Studies, Hamburg. Neuer Jungfernstieg 21, 20354 Hamburg,
Germany
2 Department of Criminology, Law, and Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
Published online: 12 November 2020
Trends in Organized Crime (2021) 24:265–281
and economic crisis in their country has reached similar proportions to those provoked
by the civil war in Syria, and it constitutes the largest migration wave in Latin
American recent history (ACNUR 2019). More than 4,8 million people left Venezuela
over the last decade. Of them, at least 1,8 million live in Colombia, and the majority
entered the country through land borders. The massive influx of migrants and the
subsequent humanitarian crisis compound the complex security scenario of a border-
land historically characterized by poverty and exclusion, state neglect, the thriving of
illegal economies, and non–state forms of order and governance (Idler 2019). Further
complicating matters, rifts between the governments of both countries have impeded
the development of concerted efforts to address the situation in the borderlands.
Against the backdrop of the strained bi-lateral relation, actions such as the closure of
borders and blockades to the transnational flow of goods and people are part of the
repertoire of tools employed by national governments. That is how, in a decision that
remains in force, the Bolivarian government of Venezuela decided to close the border
in an alleged national security maneuver against Colombian paramilitaries and smug-
gling gangs in 2015.1 Border enforcement by the Venezuelan state had a marginal
impact on deterring irregular immigration and crime dynamics. On the contrary, it
contributed to further channeling the flows of people and goods through illegal paths
controlled by non–state armed groups. These groups, in turn, seized the opportunity to
strengthen their power to regulate cross-border activities and to hold control over the
migrant population; all this with direct and profound effects on socio-spatial practices
and the (re)production of the borderland.
The engagement of organized crime in bordering practices and the complexities of
its relationship with the spatial particularities of borderlands are aspects that remain
underexplored. On the one hand, borderlands have been marginal in the literature on
organized crime. Canonical perspectives posit that organized crime groups
—henceforth OCGs— erode borders, menace the state, and put territorial sovereignty
at stake and should be therefore considered a global threat to the contemporary world
order (Payan 2006; Salehyan 2011). In contrast, other research has shown that OCGs
and other non–state armed actors, such as smuggling networks, can play a key role in
state-building process and governance capacities across borders (Goodhand 2005;
Andreas 2013; Shortland and Varese 2016), or even be considered service providers
worth of trust by those who make a living out of illegal markets (Sanchez 2015; Tinti
and Reitano 2017). Despite the developments in the analysis of organized crime in the
contexts of borderlands, this strand of scholarship lacks the tools to theorize on space
and border analysis.
On the other hand, political geography and border studies have come to a great
length in developing concepts to grasp the complexity and manifold aspects of border
and borderlands across time and space. In this regard, actions related to the creation,
management, and transformation of borders, this is ‘bordering practices’ (Parker and
Adler-Nissen 2012), have been at the core of this literature. It recognizes that bordering
practices are not a realm exclusive to the state but that other actors—ranging from local
communities to private companies, and NGOs (Cooper et al. 2016; Gavrilis 2008;
Lamb 2014)— are involved in the co-production of borders. However, this strand of
scholarship does not acknowledge the capacity of OCGs to also engage in bordering
1 During the last five years the border has been reopened in several occasions and for short periods.
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practices and the configuration of borderlands. It regards OCGs as actors that either
seek to circumvent the border to carry out their activities or that get involved in cross–
border activity to get material gains and for strategic purposes, what Rumford (2014)
calls “opportunistic use of borders.” While we agree with the idea that the relationship
between organized crime and borders its etched by economic and strategic motivations,
we contend that organized crime has deeper consequences on borders and borderlands
than recognized in this strand of literature. In fact, we consider that organized crime
constitutes an avenue to explore the social and spatial (re)production of borders.
Based on these assumptions, the present paper brings insights from political geog-
raphy and border studies into dialogue with the literature on organized crime and non–
state governance to analyze the role of organized crime in bordering practices in the
case of the Colombia-Venezuelan borderlands. We argue that the confluence of
political, socio-economic, and geostrategic factors provided a window of opportunity
for OCGs to empower as rulers in this borderland. Through the control of illegal paths
also known as trochas, the regulation of flows of people and goods across the border,
and the control over labor market and migrant population, organized crime brings to
bear in the (re)production and managing of the border.
The paper speaks to different literatures in the realms of criminology and both
security and border studies. We make a case for bordering practices as a realm of non-
state governance and show that criminal organizations engage in bordering practices in
a way that goes beyond the mere opportunistic or exploitative use of borders. Based on
the study of the Colombia–Venezuela borderlands, we demonstrate how recent political
developments provided conditions and incentives for criminal actors to actively partake
in bordering practices, notably border management and control of the immigrant
population. Bridging theoretical contributions from border studies with recent debates
on governance and crime, our analysis shades light on the role that illegal actors play in
the process of construction and deconstruction of national borders.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: we first introduce the conceptual tenets
of the analysis. Second, we describe the research strategy, case selection and data
sources and analysis. Third, we contextualize the trajectories of conflict, violence, and
crime in the Colombian-Venezuelan borderlands. Fourth, in the main section of the
paper, we analyze the linkages between organized crime and bordering practices.
Finally, we sum up the findings and discuss their implications in the understanding
of the linkages between organized crime and borderlands’ spatiality.
Border, borderlands, and bordering practices
Borders are institutions (Newman 2011; Paasi 1998). They enact a stable set of rules for
human behavior and interaction (North 1990) and fulfill a set of functions. The defining
nature of any border is the establishment of a division between spaces in political,
socio-economic, spatial, and symbolic terms. Through border control, states define and
regulate what people and goods have legitimate access to their territory (Andreas 2003).
As a spatial division, one of the main functions of the border is to protect or ‘to act as a
barrier’ (Newman 2011: 15) against actors and goods deemed as threats or harmful.
While traditional military threats and economic regulation were the main concern for
border protection, the state’s priorities regarding border security have shifted towards
policing and law enforcement (Andreas 2003). The target of policing is to avoid the
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territorial access of a plethora of non-state actors, ranging from drug traffickers,
terrorists, and smugglers to unauthorized migrants. Borders also regulate trans-
border circulation, defined as the ‘in and out’ movement between different state
territories (Newman 2011).
However, borders are also spaces of interaction and contestation. One of the
‘paradoxes of borders’ is that they divide and unite at the same time (Baud and van
Schendel 2005). Another facet connatural to borders is contestation. Several actors that
aim to manipulate, take advantage or circumvent border control persistently challenge
borders and the regulation that they embody. The complex and heterogeneous interplay
among rules, practices, and actors is what shapes borders and borderlands. Borders are
therefore a socio-territorial construction resulting from the legal and geopolitical
discourses of states, on the one hand, and the action of border societies, on the other.
In what is a co-constitutive relationship, the very existence of the border crosses and
affects the character and dynamics of the areas affected by its presence. The impact of
the border goes beyond the boundary as such and extends into the territories whose
nature and conditions are shaped by the nature of border itself (Zartman 2010: 5). The
literature refers to these areas with the concept of borderlands (Baud and van Schendel
2005; Idler 2019; Newman 2011; Zartman 2010). Idler (2019) argues that the relation-
ship with the central state and transnationality are key aspects of borderlands.
Like any institution, borders are constantly changing (Paasi 1998). While some
borders are enhanced, others wither away. Processes of regional integration imply a
reduction or abolition of border controls. For instance, the creation of the ‘Schengen
border-free zone’ implied the removal of border controls among most of the member
countries of the European Union. In contrast, security measures in the aftermath of 9/11
led to the strengthening and reclosing of borders. The notion of ‘bordering practices’
refers to the actions involved in creating, sustaining, and modifying borders between
states (Parker and Adler-Nissen 2012: 776). Bordering practices encompass a wide
range of deeds performed by both the state and non-state actors. According to Parker
and Adler-Nissen (2012), when it comes to order-making processes in borderlands,
bordering practices are more important than the existence of the border itself.
The literature on borderlands has drawn attention to the role of societal actors in
producing and sustaining borders. The state interacts with different non-state actors,
such as international organizations or multinational companies, to define and imple-
ment border policies (Gavrilis 2008). In the framework of debates regarding the
vernacularization of borders (Cooper et al. 2016), Rumford (2014) coined the term
‘border work’ to define ‘the activity of ordinary people leading to the con-
struction or dissolution of borders, and driven by their own ‘grassroots’ agendas
rather than those of the state” (p. 23). Although the conceptualization of
Rumford expands beyond state borders to encompass any spatial scale, the
term has been used to analyze the role of borderland communities and NGOs
in bordering practices (Lamb 2014; Laurie et al. 2015).
Organized crime, criminal governance, and borders
Organized crime is a multifaceted phenomenon. Hence, the concept remains
fragmented and vague (von Lampe 2016). A way to make sense of such complex
phenomenon is looking into the activities of OCGs (Sergi 2014; Varese 2017), focusing
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on the actions (crimes) of criminal groups and the way they are carried out (Sergi
2017). The role of power and the capacity to exert social regulation has been crucial in
the theorization of the activities of organized crime. The literature identifies one set of
market-oriented activities involving the production and trade of illegal goods (von
Lampe 2016; Varese 2017). For instance, Block (1983) refers to the groups that operate
exclusively in the realm of illicit economies as enterprise syndicates. The main purpose
of these groups is the provision of goods and services prohibited or highly regulated by
the state. In the realm of illegal markets, there is a high level of specialization, with
some groups focused on the production of goods and services, and others specializing
in the trading of illegal products (Shortland and Varese 2016).
Another set of activities is defined by the engagement of OCGs in the provision of
protection and their capacity to regulate conflicts within markets or among competitors.
In this regard, Block (1983) identifies a second type of criminal syndicates under the
label of power syndicates. Unlike enterprise syndicates, the strong point of power
syndicate is extorsion and the ability to coerce standing as enforcers and as violence
specialists. For instance, the role of coercion has been central to many theorizations of
organized crime. Gambetta (1993) argues that the landmark of mafias is the provision
of private protection and its distinctive function of securing transactions.
In a similar vein, Sergi (2017) posits that the capacity to govern is what
distinguishes mafias as a subgroup within the broader category of organized
crime. More recently, based on the definition of economic governance as “the
set of rules and norms that regulate exchange” (p. 44), Varese (2017) has
claimed that organized crime is a form of governance and part of a continuum
that includes criminal organizations, insurgent groups, and the state.
Hence, criminal organizations are conceived as competing actors in the aspira-
tion of governing exchanges. In this paper, we understand organized crime as a
phenomenon that encompasses both illegal enterprises and governance activities.
Following Shortland and Varese (2016), this case study presents the engage-
ment of OCGs in three types of activities: production of illegal goods, trading
of illegal goods, and finally, governance.
Regarding the last one, the concept of criminal governance has emerged as a
way to underscore the role of criminal organizations as de facto rulers and their
capacity to shape social order (Arias 2017; Barnes 2017; Lessing 2020). The
existence of criminal governance does not imply the absence or suspension of
state governance. On the contrary, as scholars have extensively documented it
implies complex interactions and exchanges in which the state and OCGs are
not always at loggerheads (Arias 2006; Auyero 2007; Snyder and Duran-
Martinez 2009; Sciarrone and Storti 2014; Dewey 2015; Denyer Willis 2015;
Dagnes et al. 2018; Lessing 2018; Sobering and Auyero 2019).
Drawing upon this notion, we argue that criminal actors are part of the governing
authorities in the Colombian-Venezuelan borderlands. They do not only partake in the
production and trade of illegal goods but govern over borderland communities in a
broad sense. They constitute local authorities setting rules while providing public goods
and services. Against this backdrop, migration control and customs (public goods) are
shaped and cooptated by OCGs. They regulate human mobility and govern immi-
grants’ and borderland communities’ lives. Therefore, the activities in which they are
engaged fit within those classified as bordering practices.
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Empirical strategy
The analysis is methodologically arranged as a case study. Given that the border area
encompasses more than 2.200 km2, our study focuses on the department of Norte de
Santander (Colombia). We chose this area because the most important border crossing
points are located there. Additionally, it is at the heart of the local economy as the axis
formed by the cities of Cucuta in Colombia and San Antonio in Venezuela constitutes
the most relevant urban system in the borderland. Norte de Santander has been the entry
point for 94 % of Venezuelan migrants traveling to Colombia by land (OCHA 2018).
Likewise, this department concentrates the second largest population of Venezuelans in
Colombia (OCHA 2018; Migración Colombia 2020).
The research draws on semi-structured interviews and direct observation conducted
in 2019 and 2020. The interviews —15 in total— were conducted in Cúcuta, San
Antonio, and Villa del Rosario. Following a purposive sampling technique,2 they
feature border-crossers, local government officials, journalists, Cucuta’s Police Depart-
ment members, non-profit organizations’, and humanitarian workers. The interviews
were analyzed using pattern coding (Saldaña 2009) and the data elicited was triangu-
lated with other sources of information such as local and national newspapers, reports
of NGOs, and secondary literature. Regarding direct observation, it was done in the
urban area of Cucuta, and the zone next to the border, specifically the area known as
“La Parada”.3 Aditionally, the study relies on statistics from official sources and reports
by humanitarian organizations.
Crime and conflict in Colombia–Venezuela borderlands
The border between Colombia and Venezuela has played a crucial role in the Colom-
bian armed conflict and the illegal economies that fuel war and crime. While the
presence of armed actors in this area goes back to the decades of 1970 and 1980, it
is possible to identify three periods in the recent history regarding war and organized
crime. The first period known as the paramilitary offensive goes from 1999 to 2004. It
sparked massive displacement of communities and members of leftist guerrillas to
Venezuela. The second one is comprised of different bilateral crises amid the alleged
support of Colombian guerrillas by the Venezuelan government and goes from 2008 to
2013. During this period, Colombian guerrillas were debilitated through peace and
military efforts and pushed to Venezuela as a rear-guard position. The third period, in
which this paper focuses, goes from 2015 until date. It starts with the Venezuelan
government’s decision of closing the border amid the massive exodus of Venezuelans
that sparked a migratory and humanitarian crisis as well as the rupture of bilateral
relations with Colombia.
Since the early 2000s, Venezuela’s security situation has deteriorated in the context
of an acute economic crisis, authoritarian practices of the Bolivarian regime, and
political polarization. Along the increase of state violence (Ávila 2019), the country
2 “Purposive sampling refers to strategies in which the researcher exercises his or her judgment about who will
provide the best perspective on the phenomenon of interest, and then intentionally invites those specific
perspectives into the study” (Abrams 2010, p. 538).
3 There the authors visited humanitarian kitchen soups. They also crossed the border through the “Simón
Bolívar” crossing point.
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has seen the sprout of a myriad of criminal organizations (pranes) and paramilitary
groups (colectivos), which gained control over the illicit markets such as drug traffick-
ing, territories, and populations, chiefly in urban slums and marginalized areas. With a
homicide rate of 60,3 per 100.000 inhabitants in 2019 (Observatorio Venezolano de
Violencia 2020), Venezuela turned into the most violent country in the world. In the
last seven years (2013–2020), the exodus of Venezuelan nationals fleeing political and
economic crisis in their country has reached similar proportions to those provoked by
the civil war in Syria (Fieser 2019). As the security situation in Colombia–Venezuela
borderlands further deteriorates, their diplomatic relationship has followed the same
path leading to a proxy war setting. According to Groh (2019) proxy support includes
the direct or indirect use of non-state and parastate groups to carry out militarized
intimidation or control territory in order to exert influence or achieve specific security
or political outcomes. The relation between the state and non–state armed actors
(proxy) is one of patron–agent; the state either directs proxy’s actions or partakes on
them. Let us to further elaborate on this point.
On the one hand, Colombia’s government has denounced several times the existence
of a coordinated strategy and support between the Venezuelan regime and Colombian
rebel groups, namely the National Liberation Army (ELN) and rearming dissident
factions of the former Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) (Reuters
2019). Likewise, several social organizations and journalists have reported on the
constant activity of Colombian armed groups in at least seventeen states of Venezuela
and mainly in the borderland ones of Zulia, Táchira and Bolivar. According to local
reports, along its control over gold mines and other economic assets, the ELN guerrilla
recruits new members and has training camps in these areas (Fundaredes 2018). For
Colombia, such support from the Venezuelan government to Colombian insurgencies is
a hostile act and a direct threat to its national security.
On the other hand, Colombia is the main geopolitical platform against the Venezu-
elan regime. As of 2020, the government of Colombia has committed to a “de facto”
political transition agenda by recognizing the self–proclaimed president of Venezuela
—Juan Guaidó— as the legitimate president of the country, while Nicolas Maduro
keeps having command and control over the state apparatus. Colombia has played a
central role in regional and hemispheric initiatives to push for a democratic transition in
Venezuela, such as the Lima Group. In early 2019, Colombia’s government organized
a concert and humanitarian action in the border area. The occasion was used to overtly
express support to Guaidó, who gave a speech during this activity. In what later became
a scandal, it was revealed that local Colombian authorities facilitated the irregular
crossing of Guaidó through the participation of members of “Los Rastrojos”, an
organized crime group of paramilitary ethos (The Guardian 2019). One hardly could
find a better instance to illustrate the linkages between the state and criminal actors and
the overlap of legal and illegal spheres in the borderland than this one.
The current relationship between Colombia and Venezuela can be defined as one of
enmity, given that both countries blame each other for advancing hostile strategies to
destabilize its counterpart. This has contributed to further aggravate the security and
humanitarian crisis in the borderland as no security, immigration or border bilateral
policy can be neither coordinated nor developed. Against this background, the region
has provided a context favorable for the further flourishing of a plethora of non-state
armed groups. The following table offers a list of some of the most relevant criminal
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groups. They encompass OCGs as well as hybrids —insurgencies involved in orga-
nized crime activities. Given the fragmentation, the rapid pace of change of these
groups, and the diversity of organizational structures, the list may not reflect the current
constellation of armed actors (Table 1).
Enforcing and exploiting the border: Illegal paths and criminal governance
Smuggling has been a connatural activity to many borderlands (Andreas 2000; Sadikki
2017), and Norte de Santander’s borderland is not the exception. Since the second half
of the twentieth century, smuggling of goods such as fuel gas and electronics was
regarded as a common activity that has effectively merged with the formal economy.
This moral economy is not only the result of sociocultural practices of border–crossing
regarded as a legitimate way of making a living but also derives from the political and
economic denial of the region by political elites from Bogotá and Caracas (Idler 2019).
Illegal paths or trochas have been the spatial mechanism enabling this cross-border
activity and can be regarded as a corollary of the “border work” of communities.
However, amid the war and criminal activities, the illegal paths have also been used
by different armed actors. While one can argue that bordering practices by armed
groups were not a new phenomenon in the area, the current migratory and humanitarian
crisis and the closure of the border in 2015 contributed further to strengthen the power
of these actors over borderlands. Although the closure was part of a strategy of
organized crime control by the Venezuelan state, it had a marginal impact on deterring
irregular immigration and criminal activities. Instead, it created a window of opportu-
nity for organized crime to diversify their illegal profits, extend its control over human
mobility, and set new mechanisms through which state officials engage in collusion
arrangements with OCGs creating a situation of border control paradox (Mantilla
2019). In the case under analysis, the further border enforcement over binational
communities as a political and military artifact changed the relationship between OCGs
and space benefiting OCGs in at least three ways.
Turf over drugs
First, the border closure produced a shock in illegal markets and spatial practices since
the control of the paths for traditional smuggling and the informal crossing became a
major source of illegal profits. With about 40,000 people crossing every day —in
between pendular immigrants and people trying to flee Venezuela— the closure of
international ports of entry spilled thousands of people to illegal paths and into the
hands of those who control them, altering the current balance of power among
organized crime and state authorities. As a local journalist accounts: “Smuggling at
the border is not anymore just about the gasoline. Everything is crossing through the
border, which actually makes the control of an illegal path much more profitable than
selling drugs or other illegal business. Every day, every minute people are crossing
and so someone is making money”.4
Despite the instability that is supposed to characterize illegal economies and smug-
gling settings, the tolls that OCGs charge to allow border crossing are fixed and vary
4 Interview with regional journalist, Cúcuta, July 2019.
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according to the goods and people to be smuggled. Thus, an irregular immigrant pays a
fixed toll for crossing while a truck with licit goods trade illegally, such as medicines or
chemical supplies, pays a different one. This scheme of prices matches findings
reported in other contexts where informal institutions display differential regulatory
nodes according to the type of good (licit/illicit) smuggled (Gallien 2019). As in any
other market, prices react to changes in demand. Thus, after the Colombia government
decided to enforce closure measures at the border in the face of the COVID-19 public
health crisis, the price that OCGs were charging to people to use the trochas spiked in
almost five hundred percent (El Tiempo 2020).
Assisted travel and micropolitics of informality
Second, besides contributing to further turning the illegal paths into highly regarded
assets, the closure of 2015 paved the way for the configuration of both an informal
sphere of control of transnational migratory flows and an expanded portfolio of illegal
and legal markets. According to Antillano, Zublillaga, Sánchez & Ortíz (Forthcoming),
people relying on illegal paths for the sake of immigrating to Colombia are those who
do not have a valid passport or a migratory card, those who do not have enough time to
make the lagging lines to get their passports stamped by Colombian migration author-
ities, or those that were previously deported by the Colombian immigration authority.
Migrants’ precariousness makes them dependent on the services offered by OCGs as
well as particularly vulnerable to different forms of victimization.
Furthermore, OCGs play a key role for people trying to flee Venezuela given that they
provide access to services and connections that are crucial for the immigrants. The services
feature the crossing to the Colombian side and travel arrangements from this point to other
cities in Colombia or countries in the region. A bus terminal located next to the “Simón
Bolívar” bridge, the main border-crossing point, is the next stage for many migrants after
leaving Venezuela. Many of our informants commented about the links between OCGs and
travel agencies located in the area. OCGs also provide the means of connection to other
illegal economies such as sex trade or coca crops related employments. As an illicit market,
smuggling does not always rely on violence. Rather, it depends on the broader political and
social context wherein the criminal group operates more than the nature and the structure of
the group itself (Andreas andWallman 2009; Sanchez 2015). In this sense, the variation on
the use of coercion makes difficult to set a clear-cut division between the provision of
services demanded by immigrants and human trafficking. Although further investigation is
required, the evidence collected suggests that OCGs are involved in both activities. Some
participants talked about the role of OCGs as service providers and facilitators, whilst others
point out that some immigrants are brought to the country in the frame of human trafficking
networks as victims of different forms of exploitation.
Likewise, OCGs became de facto rulers in the neighborhoods adjacent to the border.
They organize the micro-politics of informality and deliver street justice in places such
as “La Parada”, where immigrants try to have access to humanitarian aid, transporta-
tion services, street vending entrepreneurship, or immigration and work permissions.
While OCGs perform the role of service providers and social authorities, they also
make use of different repertoires of violence and terror, such as beheadings or
dismemberments. This is the case of “La Frontera,” an OCG responsible for multiple
massacres between 2016 and 2018. In one of the incidents that occurred in January of
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2018, body parts of four victims were spread on one of the trochas connecting the two
countries (La Opinión 2018a). In the investigations leading to set the suspected
responsibility of this group, more than one hundred Venezuelan and Colombian ID
cards were found in a warehouse revealing the extent to which this group had control of
irregular immigrants who were previously reported as missing or who were surrendered
to human trafficking networks (La Opinión 2018b).
Engaging in the activities described above, OCGs have become the ultimate customs
and migratory authorities, defining the circumstances of place, means, and time in
which the border can be crossed or not. Furthermore, they perform border governance
in ways that assure reliability to those using smuggling services. Following Idler (2019)
criminal governance at the border resembles a social contract–like relationship in which
OCGs provide public goods and services and define the rules of appropriate behavior
while neglected citizens recognize their shadow authority.
Systematic collusion
Third and lastly, the border closure contributed to strengthen collusion mechanisms
between the state and OCGs. The relationship between the state and illegality is a complex
one in borderland contexts. For Goodhand (2013), state presence in these contexts is
contingent, contested, and changing. In contrast to previous research that addresses
criminality in Colombian borderlands as the consequence of state fragility and its inca-
pacity to deliver effective security (Idler 2019; Castrillón and Valencia 2019; Villa and
Souza 2019), we build on the assumption that state presence cannot simply be equated
with law and order. As previous literature has noted, organized crime requires the “studied
ignorance or tacit consent”(Schneider and Schneider 1999) of the state to work. Licit and
illicit practices coexist and are imbricated in manifold ways. More so, illicit practices are
often part of the processes of state-making and border control (Abraham and Van
Schendel 2005; Goodhand 2013; Gallien 2019).
The strategic interactions between border enforcers and unauthorized border crossers
that Andreas (2000) calls “border games” imply that state authorities and OCGs often
collaborate through the means of corruption. This is a widespread practice in Norte de
Santander where, for years, the overwhelming power of paramilitaries and guerillas left
no choice for law enforcement units rather than comply with de facto omerta. However,
mechanisms of collusion between the state and OCGs have developed in such ways
that, for many residents and participants in illegal economies, state security forces are
just, or at least behave as, another OCG. Regarding traditional bribery, corruption
schemes work through monthly payments depending on the OCG and the rank of state
agents. For instance, in the municipality of Puerto Santander, an agent cooperating with
“Los Rastrojos” receives from 80 to 100 dollars per month, while higher ranks can
receive between 200 and 300 dollars. According to both police officers and their
families, it is not even an option to say no. A brother in law of a Police captain
deployed in one of the border checkpoints said “the police here is still afraid of the
armed groups, so they limit their job to a passive and blind eye one in the context of
generalized extortion. My brother in law is a couple of years away from retirement; he
doesn’t want problems or unnecessary risks at this point so what else he can do?”5
5 Interview local resident, Cúcuta, July 2019.
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Nevertheless, only a couple of weeks after this interview, counterintelligence and
anti-corruption units captured the police intendant of Puerto Santander for being an
active member of Los Rastrojos. According to the indictment, he was the second in the
command line of this OCG and has been an active member of this group for the last six
years (La Opinión 2020). Less than a month after this incident, Venezuelan security
forces captured the police chief of Táchira while she was transporting ammunition,
pamphlets and war material for Los Rastrojos (La Prensa Táchira 2020). These
incidents suggest that the relation between OCGs and the state goes beyond mere
intimidation and bribery and that schemes are more similar to state sponsor protection
rackets (Snyder and Duran-Martinez 2009) or that state capture (Garay-Salamanca and
Salcedo-Albarán 2012) may be at play.
Other evidence highlights the fact that state officials directly victimize vulnerable
immigrants. Reports about Colombian migration officials running a scheme of extortion
in exchange for easing the migratory process are common in the soup kitchens that
philanthropists and volunteers’ efforts have brought together at immigrant shelters at the
border. Presumably, immigration officials retain Venezuelan passports and then ask for a
money ransom to give them back. These forms of victimization are gender informed.
Thus, in the case of women, passports can be retained for the sake of sexual favors. It is
important to note that, in the context of a migratory crisis and the vulnerability of people
fleeing Venezuela, passports are the most valuable and useful good someone can hold
and, therefore, a mechanism of power and control. Victimization infringed by state
officials may explain the gap between locals’ perceptions of the trochas vis–á–vis state
narratives of dangerous criminal groups controlling these illegal paths. Similarly, for
gasoline smugglers the police Fiscal and Customs Police (Polfa in Spanish) is regarded
as just another OCG. When asked about the interactions with the police, one of their
most recognized leaders vehemently claimed: “About the police, I can only say that they
are just another group. They steal from us in our face, just like that, straight forward.
They confiscate ten pimpinas6 from us but they only report two. The complicity between
criminal bands and the police is pretty obvious fromwhat you can see that is going on”.7
The account of how locals from the Norte de Santander feel about the border as an
artifact imposed by OCGs and by the state fit into what Abraham and Van Schendel
(2005) describe as a gap in between behaviors and identity when talking about crimi-
nality across borders. The fact that OCGs and the state have similar behaviors to the eyes
of the community highlights that the state authority is just one form of political authority
among others in the borderlands. The variety of social agents involved in bordering
practices, the diversity of the interactions between this variety of actors, and the
institutional effects of the parallel set of norms serve to outline the complexity of the
relationship between the state, organized crime, and space in the borderlands.
Bordering practices and organized crime beyond the trochas
As mentioned above, the precariousness of the migrants makes them vulnerable to
several forms of exploitation and victimization. Criminal organizations leverage the
6 Pimpinas are recipients in which smugglers carry gasoline. They are equitable to several gallons and the
reason why gasoline smugglers identify themselves as “pimpineros”.
7 Interview with gasoline union affiliate, Cúcuta, January 2020.
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availability of cheap labor; they have recruited Venezuelan migrants as part of their
armed structures or integrated them into illegal markets such as drug production and
sexual exploitation (Fundaredes 2018; La Opinión 2019; OCHA 2018).
This is the case of the coca crops and coca laboratories. The Catatumbo region,
which ranks as the third with the largest number of hectares of coca cultivation in
Colombia (UNODC 2019), is part of the Colombia-Venezuela borderlands. It is
estimated that around 25,000 Venezuelans are in the Catatumbo (OCHA 2019). Some
informants recounted that in the municipality of Tibu —which has a high number of
hectares of coca cultivation in the region—many of the “raspachines”8 are Venezuelan
and noted that the composition of the workforce in coca cultivation in some villages of
this municipality went through a transformation over the last years with Venezuelans
currently making up at least 70% of the people working on the crops. An officer of a
local NGO9 commented that people working in coca leaf production could earn up to
U$120 dollars per week. Upon arrival in the territory, migrants must abide by the rules
and authority of the incumbent OCG. In some cases, they must carry a letter of
recommendation to prove that they have “authorization” to live there or must be
recommended by a local person to access to the community. In the face of conflicts
between settlers and immigrants, OCGs also intervene to solve conflicts and disputes.
Since the Colombian state has no control over the population entering the country
through the trochas, local dwellers and humanitarian organizations report that groups
such as EPL and ELN have enforced their own mechanisms to manage and control
immigrants. According to OCHA (2018), ELN issues a sort of migration permit either
when people are crossing through illegal paths or when migrants arrive in communities
under their control. The license serves as a means to control immigrants’ mobility and
access to job market. Similarly, some of our informants note that this group exerts the
same practice in the Catatumbo region.10 In this case, the permit is valid for sixty days
and allows the migrant to stay in the region and work; its renewal depends on an
assessment of the behavior of the migrant and their compliance with criminal gover-
nance rules.
Discussion and conclusions
Traditional state-centric perspectives on crime, borders, and governance have
overshadowed the complexities of the relationship between organized crime and
borderlands (Abraham and Van Schendel 2005). Considering this, the article has
presented an analysis of the engagement of organized crime on bordering practices
and the co-production of borders in the case of the Colombia-Venezuela borderlands.
Contrary to common assumptions on organized crime bypassing or circumventing
state borders, our study showed that criminal organizations also seek to set norms and
regulate the cross-border flux of goods and people; willing to enforce the border for
their own benefit if the strategic environment provides the opportunity to do so. Similar
to other cases (Massey 2017; Tinti and Reitano 2017), rather than deterring organized
8 This is the name given to workers that harvest (scrape) coca leaf.
9 Interview officer of humanitarian NGO, Cúcuta, August 2019.
10 Interview with a grass-roots organization’s leader, Cúcuta, August 2019.
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crime activities, the closure of the border by the Venezuelan government created new
opportunities and assets for OCGs. Namely, it enhanced criminal organizations such as
Colombian guerrillas, OCGs of paramilitary ethos, and bi-national gangs to further
engage and control human and goods smuggling operations, border management, and
social control over the migrant population.
As shown by previous research, interactions among OCGs and between these and
the state can follow different patterns ranging from enmity, to rivalry and cooperation
(Idler 2019:40). In short, the relationship between OCGs and borderlands should not be
taken for granted as traditional national security approaches suggest. Bordering prac-
tices in the context of illicitness shape local economies and institutions considered
rightful by locals (Gallien 2019; Rolandsen 2019).
In addition, organized crime activities in the borderlands exceed conventional
definitions focused on the provision of illegal goods, services, and predatory crimes.
Rather OCGs also constitute the ultimate customs and migratory authorities. Particu-
larly, in spatial terms, organized crime power goes beyond the management of the
clandestine paths and extends into other levels of the social order in the borderland. For
many Venezuelan migrants, entering Colombia is tantamount to entering a realm where
spatial practices, social regulation, and their own life are shaped not by the rules of the
Colombian state but by OCGs. Bordering practices by organized crime shape the
borderland and the life of its inhabitants.
This case illustrates the complexities of border politics. Borders are not the result of
the command of the state, but instead of the practices and interaction of multiple actors,
OCGs among them. In this regard, the analysis sheds light on how spatial particularities
of the borderlands, and the actions of OCGs have profound consequences on the
management and (re)shaping of the border. Thus, similar to what literature on border
studies have described in the case of other societal groups, it is possible to argue that
OCGs also engage in ‘border work’ (Rumford 2014) and perform bordering practices.
Colombia-Venezuela borderlands are shaped by complex interactions between the
state, local communities, migrant population, and organized crime. One of the main
limitations of this paper and an avenue of future research is to assess how OCGs build
legitimacy over negotiations with borderland communities. In addition, although this
borderland is a place of despair, it is also a source of hope for thousands who are able to
perform social resilience. Further research should look into what kind of life and
agency is possible for those under criminal governance.
Bordering practices is, hence, another facet of criminal governance in transnational
contexts and should be considered as a set of practices to further document and study
within organized crime literature. If we accept the idea that the activities of organized
crime are a form of governance (Varese 2017), or that OCGs can decide whether to
exert criminal governance or not (Lessing 2020), then we should consider
competitive border–making as an area of dispute, cooperation, and exploitation
between OCGs and the state. Adding to concepts coined to express the partic-
ularities of security in borderlands, such as border effect (Idler 2019), we think
that bordering practices offer an untapped analytical potential to understand
how and why OCGs get involved in the provision of public goods, the
enforcement of rules, and co-constitutive linkages to space.
Funding Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.
278 Trends in Organized Crime (2021) 24:265–281
Compliance with ethical standards
Conflict of interest Viviana García Pinzón declares that she has no conflict of interest.
Jorge Mantilla declares that he has no conflict of interest.
Research involving human participants or animal studies All interviewees were individually informed
about the objectives of the research and conditions of their participation and verbal informed consent was
obtained prior to the interview. The research complies with the principles of anonymity and confidentiality to
secure the safety of the participants. Authors are responsible for correctness of the statements provided in the
manuscript.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which
permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and
indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the
article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory
regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
References
Abraham I, Van Schendel W (2005) Illicit flows and criminal things states, borders, and the other side of
globalization. Indiana University Press, Bloomington
Abrams LS (2010) Sampling ‘hard to reach’ populations in qualitative research. Qualitative Social Work:
Research and Practice 9(4):536–550. https://doi.org/10.1177/1473325010367821
ACNUR (2019) Situación en Venezuela. Available at: https://www.acnurorg/situacion-en-venezuela.
Accessed 20/04/2020
Andreas P (2000) Border games: policing the US-Mexico divide. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
Andreas P (2003) Redrawing the line: Borders and security in the twenty-first century. Int Secur 28(2):78–111
Andreas P (2013) Smuggler nation how illicit trade made america. Oxford University Press, New York
Andreas P, Wallman J (2009) Illicit markets and violence: what is the relationship? Crime Law Soc Chang 52:
225–229
Arias E (2006) The dynamics of criminal governance: networks and social order in Rio de Janeiro. J Lat Am
Stud 38:293–232
Arias E (2017) Criminal enterprises and governance in Latin America and the Caribbean. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge
Auyero J (2007) Routine politics and violence in Argentina. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Ávila K (2019) Una masacre por goteo: Venezuela y la violencia institucional. Nueva Sociedad. Available at:
https://nuso.org/articulo/venezuela-maduro-represion-izquierda. Accessed 13/03/2020
Barnes, N (2017) Criminal politics: an integrated approach to the study of organized crime, politics, and
violence. Perspectives on Politics American Political Science Association Special Section Articles, Vol.
15–4
BaudM, van Schendel W (2005) Toward a comparative history of borderlands. Journal of World History 8(2):
211–242
Block A (1983) East side, west side: organizing crime in New York 1930–1950. Transaction Publishers, New
Brunswick
Castrillón J, Valencia J (2019) Reconfiguración de la frontera Norte de Santander-Táchira: Ilegalidad, Crimen
Organizado y Corrupción. Revista Opera 24:157–177
Cooper A, Perkins C, Rumford C (2016) The Vernacularization of Borders. In: Jones R, Johnson C (eds)
Placing the border in everyday life. Routledge, London
Dagnes J, Donatiello D, Moiso V, Pellegrino D, Sciarrone R, Storti L (2018) Mafia infiltration, public
administration and local institutions: a comparative study in northern Italy. Eur J Criminol 17:540–562.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370818803050
279Trends in Organized Crime (2021) 24:265–281
Denyer Willis, G., 1979-. (2015). The killing consensus: police, organized crime, and the regulation of life and
death in urban Brazil. Oakland, California: University of California Press
Dewey M (2015) El Orden Clandestino: Política, Fuerzas de Seguridad y Mercados Ilegales en Argentina.
Katz, Buenos Aires
El Tiempo (2020) Grupos Criminales cobran hasta $100.000 por dar paso en la frontera. Available at: https://
www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/cierre-de-frontera-con-venezuela-panorama-de-medidas-
por-coronavirus-en-norte-de-santander-474356. Accessed 22/04/2020
Fieser E (2019) Venezuela Exodus is as big as Sirya’s. Yet Got 1% of the Aid. Available at: https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-20/venezuela-exodus-as-big-as-syria-s-got-1-5-of-the-aid-chart.
Accessed 20/01/2020
Fundaredes (2018) Informe Anual Fundaredes: 2018. Available at: https://www.fundaredes.org/2019/04/12/
informe-fundaredes-2018/. Accessed 15/01/2020
Gallien M (2019) Informal institutions and the regulation of smuggling in North Africa. Perspectives on
Politics 18:1–17. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719001026
Gambetta D (1993) The Sicilian mafia: the business of private protection. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA
Garay-Salamanca LJ, Salcedo-Albarán E (2012) Institutional impact of criminal networks in Colombia and
Mexico. Crime Law and Social Change 57:177–194 https://doi-org.proxy.cc.uic.edu/10.1007/s10611-
011-9338-x
Gavrilis G (2008) The dynamics of interstate boundaries. Cambridge University Press, New York
Goodhand J (2005) Frontiers and wars: the opium economy in Afghanistan. J Agrar Chang 5(2):191–216
Goodhand J (2013) The view from the border. In: Korf B, Raeymaekers T (eds) Violence on the margins:
state, conflict, and borderlands. Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Groh T (2019) Proxy war: the least bad option. Stanford University Press, Stanford CA
Idler A (2019) Borderland battles: violence, crime, and governance at the edges of Colombia’s war. Oxford
University Press, New York
La Opinión (2018a) Las huellas delataron a los homicidas de cuatro venezolanos en La Parada. Available at:
https://www.laopinion.com.co/judicial/las-huellas-delataron-los-homicidas-de-cuatro-venezolanos-en-la-
parada-153504#OP. Accessed 20/03/2020
La Opinión (2018b) La Parada: una masacre anunciada? Available at: https://www.laopinion.com.co/judicial/
la-parada-una-masacre-anunciada-147534. Accessed 13/03/2020
La Opinión (2019) Narcocultivos en Tibú, el imprevisto destino de migrantes venezolanos. Available at:
https://www.laopinion.com.co/frontera/narcocultivos-en-tibu-el-imprevisto-destino-de-migrantes-
venezolanos-171238#OP. Accessed 28/03/2020
La Opinión (2020) Capturan a Policía en Cúcuta señalado de ser cabecilla de “Los Rastrojos”. Available at:
https://www.laopinion.com.co/judicial/capturan-policia-en-cucuta-senalado-de-ser-cabecilla-de-los-
rastrojos-191143#OP. Accessed 12/03/2020
La Prensa Táchira (2020) Detienen a mujer policía con 630 municiones de guerra. Available at: https://
laprensatachira.com/nota/7679/2020/02/detienen-a-mujer-policia-con-630-municiones-de-guerra.
Accessed 15/07/2020
Lamb V (2014) “Where is the border?” villagers, environmental consultants and the ‘work’ of the Thai–
Burma border. Polit Geogr 40:1–12
Laurie N, Richardson D, Poudel M, Townsend J (2015) Post-trafficking bordering practices: perverse co-
production, marking and stretching borders. Polit Geogr 48:83–92
Lessing B (2018) Making peace in drug wars: crackdowns and cartels in Latin America. Cambridge
University Press, New York
Lessing B (2020) Conceptualizing Criminal Governance. In: Conceptualizing Criminal Governance.
Perspectives on Politics, Online First, pp 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720001243
Mantilla J (2019) The Border control paradox in Venezuela. Available at: https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-
subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2019/12/border-control. Accessed
23/02/2020
Massey D (2017) The counterproductive consequences of border enforcement. The Cato Journal Cato Institute
37(3)
Migración Colombia (2020) Más de 1 millón 825 mil venezolanos estarían radicados en Colombia. Available
at: https://www.migracioncolombia.gov.co/noticias/265-abril-2020/mas-de-1-millon-825-mil-
venezolanos-estarian-radicados-en-colombia. Accessed 12/05/2020
Newman D (2011) On borders and power: a theoretical framework. Journal of Borderlands Studies 18(1):13–
25
280 Trends in Organized Crime (2021) 24:265–281
North D (1990) Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. Cambridge University Press,
New York
Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia (2020) Informe Anual. Available at: https://observatoriodeviolencia.
org.ve/news/informe-anual-de-violencia-2019/. Accessed 12/03/2020
OCHA (2018) Briefing Departamental. Norte de Santander. Available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.
info/es/operations/colombia/document/brieffing-norte-de-santander. Accessed 24/07/2020
OCHA (2019) Boletín Humanitario Febrero 2019. Available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/
operations/colombia/document/bolet%C3%ADn-humanitario-febrero-2019. Accessed 20/04/2020
Paasi A (1998) Boundaries as social processes: territoriality in the world of flows. Geopolitics 3(1):69–88
Parker N, Adler-Nissen R (2012) Picking and choosing the “sovereign” border: a theory of changing state
bordering practices. Geopolitics 17(4):773–796
Payan, T. (2006) The three U.S.-mexico border wars: Drugs, immigration, and homeland security. Westport,
Conn: Praeger Security International
Reuters (2019) Colombia’s Duque tells UN the Dossier proves Maduros supports terrorists. Available at:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-colombia/colombias-duque-tells-un-that-dossier-
proves-maduro-supports-terrorists-idUSKBN1WA2XH. Accessed 10/03/2020
Rolandsen O (2019) Trade, peace building and hybrid governance in the South-Sudan Sudan borderlands.
Confl Secur Dev 19(1):79–97
Rumford C (2014) Cosmopolitan Borders. Palgrave Macmillan UK, London
Saddiki S (2017) World of walls: the structure, roles and effectiveness of separation barriers. Open Book
Publishers
Saldaña J (2009) The coding manual for qualitative researchers. CA Sage Publications, Los Angeles
Salehyan, I (2011) Rebels without borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics Ithaca: Cornell
University Press
Sanchez G (2015) Human smuggling and border crossings. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Schneider J, Schneider P (1999) Is transparency possible? The political-economic and epistemological
implications of cold-war conspiracies and subterfuge in Italy. In: Heyman J, Smart A (eds) States and
illegal practices: an overview. Berg, New York
Sciarrone R, Storti L (2014) The territorial expansion of mafia-type organized crime. The case of the Italian
mafia in Germany. Crime Law Soc Change 61:37–60. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-013-9473-7
Sergi A (2014) Structure versus activity. Policing organized crime in Italy and in the UK. Distance and
Convergence Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice 8(1):69–78. https://doi.org/10.1093/police/pat033
Sergi A (2017) From mafia to organised crime a comparative analysis of policing models. Palgrave
Macmillan, Cham
Shortland A, Varese F (2016) State-building, informal governance and organised crime: the case of Somali
piracy. Political Studies 64(4):811–831. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12227
Snyder R, Duran-Martinez A (2009) Does illegality breed violence? Drug trafficking and state-sponsored
protection rackets. Crime Law Soc Change 52:253–273. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-009-9195-z
Sobering K, Auyero J (2019) Collusion and cynicism at the urban margins. Latin America Research Review
54(1):222–236
The Guardian (2019) Venezuela’s Guaidó pictured with members of Colombian gang. Available at: https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/13/juan-guaido-faces-questions-over-links-toorganized-groups.
Accessed 23/12/2019
Tinti P, Reitano T (2017) Migrant, Refugee, Smuggler, Savoir. Oxford University Press, Oxford
UNODC (2019) Colombia. Monitoreo de Territorios Afectados por Cultivos Ilícitos 2018. Bogotá
Varese, F (2017) What is Organised Crime? In: Carnevale S, Forlati, S & Orsetta G (eds) Redefining
Organised Crime. A Challenge for the European Union? (pp. 27–55). Oxford: Hart Publishing
Villa R, Souza M (2019) Violent non-state actors and new forms of governance: exploring the Colombian and
Venezuelan border zone. Journal of Human Security 15(1):16–18
Von Lampe K (2016) Organized crime. Analyzing illegal activities, criminal structures, and extra-legal
governance. SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, California
Zartman I (2010) Understanding life in the borderlands: boundaries in depth and motion. University of
Georgia Press, Athens, Georgia
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
institutional affiliations.
281Trends in Organized Crime (2021) 24:265–281
